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One of themost basic predictions of almost anymodel of crime is that
individual time preferences matter. However, empirical evidence on
this fundamental property is essentially nonexistent. To our knowl-
edge, this paper provides the first pieces of evidence on the link
between time discounting and crime. We use a unique dataset that
combines a survey-based measure of time discount rates (at age 13)
with detailed longitudinal register data on criminal behavior span-
ning over 18 y. Our results show that individuals with short time
horizons have a significantly higher risk of criminal involvement later
in life. The magnitude of the relationship is substantial and corre-
sponds to roughly one-third of the association between intelligence
and crime.
time discounting | intertemporal choice | crime
One of the most basic predictions of almost any model ofcrime is that individual time preferences matter (see, e.g.,
ref. 1). The reason is that individuals may differ in the way they
balance the rewards of a crime that are savored immediately and
its potential costs in terms of apprehension and punishment that
are borne in the future. As noted by Wilson and Herrnstein,
because “the rewards of crime usually precede the costs of crime
[...] time discounting becomes extremely important in explaining
criminal behavior” (2). However, empirical evidence on this
fundamental property is essentially nonexistent.
In this paper, we empirically investigate whether individual
time discounting predicts subsequent criminal involvement. Our
investigation requires unusually rich data. Ideally, time discount
rates should be measured before individuals start getting in-
volved in criminal activity to ease complications due to reverse
causation. It is further necessary to link this information to
credible indicators of criminal involvement and to follow the
individuals for a period that stretches well beyond the peak of
the age–crime profile. These restrictions effectively rule out any
recently constructed dataset.
Our data originate from a Swedish longitudinal dataset that
contains information on children’s time discount rates collected
from a survey held in the year 1966 when the children were 13 y of
age. The respondents’ answers have been linked to administrative
registers, which enables us to follow the 13,606 children who par-
ticipated in the survey for a period of 18 y. Time discounting is
measured through a question in which the children were asked
to rate the extent to which they prefer: Swedish Krona (SEK)
900 [US dollar (USD) 140] today over SEK 9,000 (USD 1,400) in
5 y using a five-point scale (in 2013 year’s price level). Our mea-
sures of crime originate from two sources: (i) interventions by so-
cial authorities due to delinquent behavior of children up to age 18;
(ii) the universe of criminal convictions for all individuals between
ages 15 and 31. Besides details about the type of crime, there is in-
formation on crime both at the extensive and intensive margins.
For several reasons, the dataset is ideal for our purposes. First,
the survey was administered relatively early in life before the onset
of illegal involvement; yet it was taken sufficiently late so that the
respondents are likely to have been able to understand the nature
of the question. The fact that the survey was conducted in all
schools in the Stockholm metropolitan area implies that all pupils
present at school during that particular day took part in the survey,
which increases the external validity of our results. Moreover, the
use of administrative data means there is virtually no sample at-
trition. Just as in the entire literature on preference parameters (see
ref. 3 for a review), we focus on the predictive value of time dis-
counting and avoid claims about causality. (Admittedly, causal effects
are very difficult to elicit because—even in a laboratory setting—
one cannot exclude the possibility that other preferences are also
influenced by the experiment.) However, another key feature of the
dataset is that it includes information on parental education and
income. Being able to adjust for parental socioeconomic back-
ground in the analysis is important because it alleviates concerns
that responses to the survey might reflect differences in the family
budget constraint. An additional benefit is that the data include
results on a cognitive ability test that was part of the survey. This is
important as the literature on economic preferences has found that
ability and time preferences interact (4, 5).
To preview our results, we find that time discounting significantly
predicts criminal activity. When comparing the size of the re-
lationship to that of the association between intelligence and crime,
we find that the former is about one-third of the size of the latter.
We also find that high discount rates predict crime more strongly at
the extensive margin rather than for total crime (i.e., the number of
crimes). The link is much stronger for property crime and among
males with low intelligence (both for property and violent crime).
Our results thus confirm the central property of the standard
model of criminal behavior that time discounting matters. This
bears important policy lessons as one key implication of the
model is that stricter sanctions will reduce crime because it
lowers the present expected value of criminal activity (6). The
effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument to fight crime, how-
ever, largely depends on how heavily potential criminals discount
future events. If criminals have short time horizons, the delayed
costs do not motivate them to refrain from criminal activities and
punishment may not act as a key deterrent. Thus, policies that
increase the likelihood of being caught (cf. ref. 7), such as
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increased surveillance or police resources, are likely to be relatively
more efficient for individuals with high discount rates.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First,
in the leading criminological theory of crime, the ability to exercise
self-control in the face of opportunity is hypothesized to explain a
large portion of all criminal behavior (8). Although the concept of
self-control is related to that of time discounting, there is no
consensus in the literature on the concept and measurement of
self-control (9–12). Self-control is assumed to be coalesced with a
number of interrelated individual characteristics such as impul-
siveness, lack of persistence, and inability to delay gratification.
Some studies have used behavioral markers such as the length of
time one can squeeze a hand grip, keeping within lines while
drawing a maze, or various betting behaviors. Other studies use
self-reported measures, such as the self-reported inability to avoid
thinking about white bears when instructed to do so or reports by
parents or teachers. A summary of different measures used is
found in ref. 13. Given the variety of measures, it is not surprising
that the empirical examinations provide mixed evidence. [See also
the metaanalysis provided by Pratt and Cullen (14).]
Only a few studies provide longitudinal evidence on the re-
lationship between self-control and behavior. The seminal work
by Walter Mischel and coauthors (15–17) analyzes the relation-
ship between self-control and children’s subsequent behavior.
Their experiment measured delay of gratification by the time
children aged 4 could wait for a larger treat relative to a smaller
immediate treat. Another study in the same spirit but with a larger
sample size measures self-control at various ages by a composite
that among others incorporates parental–teacher ratings of child-
ren’s aggression, hyperactivity, and impulsivity, with self-reports of
attention problems and observational ratings of restlessness and
stamina, for a cohort of around 1,000 New Zealand children. The
results show that low values of the self-control index strongly
predict the likelihood of being convicted in court (18). Nagin and
Pogarsky (19) measure time preferences using survey questions
asking the respondents to estimate the chances they would live to
age 35, and how often during the past week they felt hopeful about
the future. They find that respondents with high discount rates
were more involved in criminal activities. These measures probably
also do not adequately capture intertemporal trade-offs, however,
because they could instead be seen as being a proxy for factors such
as health or family background. Cadena and Keys (20) find that
individuals who were classified as impatient by interviewers had
lower educational attainment and reduced labor supply.
Our paper differs from this and other studies in the sense that
the measure we use explicitly captures the trade-off between the
present and the future faced by potential criminals. Although
being related, the indexes on self-control used in other studies
cannot easily be interpreted as measuring time preferences be-
cause most of their components, such as aggression and attention
disorders, are not meant to capture the relative weight individ-
uals place on current versus future events. Because our measure
entails a hypothetical monetary trade-off between the present
and the future, it is unlikely that this measure of time discount
rates is related to self-control problems. The fact that we find
stronger effects for property crime can also be interpreted as
tentative evidence that self-control is not the major factor driving
our results. Indeed, it seems plausible that self-control problems
are more strongly connected to violent crime, which can be seen
as crimes of passion, rather than property crimes that are fi-
nancially motivated crimes, which typically involve an element
of planning.
We also contribute to the growing literature concerning the
predictive value of time preferences for real-world outcomes.
This literature employs direct measures of time discounting.
Several studies have documented that time preferences in the
adult population are significantly correlated with field outcomes
such as occupational choice (21), credit card borrowing (22), and
smoking (23). Sutter et al. (24) relate risk attitudes and time
preferences to health-related behavior and savings decisions in
an experimental setting. Their cross-sectional evidence suggests
that discount rates among children aged 10–18 correlate with their
body mass index, savings as well as spending on alcohol and to-
bacco. In an intertemporal choice laboratory experiment, Dohmen
et al. (5) find that patience among adults is significantly associated
with higher cognitive ability. Golsteyn et al. (25) show a strong
negative correlation between high discount rates during childhood
and various indicators of human capital, health, and lifetime in-
come. The association is robust when controlling for factors such
as family socioeconomic background and ability, and persists well
into adulthood.
Materials and Methods
The data used in this study are a longitudinal dataset called the StockholmBirth
Cohort (SBC).* The SBC is a matching of two longitudinal datasets: the
Stockholm Metropolitan Study (SMS) and the Swedish Work and Mortality
Database. For the purpose of this study, we use only the SMS part of the SBC,
which consists of all children born in 1953 in the Stockholm metropolitan area.
The data include information from a school study that was conducted in
1966 when the cohort members were 13 y of age. During one school day,
pupils at practically all schools in the county filled out two questionnaires,
including the question that we use to elicit time discounting, and took a
spatial cognitive ability test, which we use to measure cognitive ability. An
important aspect of the survey is that it took place at school, which gave it a
mandatory character. As a result, the nonresponse rate is only 9% (the
percentage of pupils absent on that particular school day). (Although one
could in principle be worried that absent children may have higher than
average discount rates, it seems likely that the overwhelming majority of the
children were absent because of actual sickness.) The low nonresponse rate
in combination with the fact that the survey was held among all students in
the county is likely to increase the external validity of our study. This is an
advantage compared with laboratory-based studies in which the partici-
pants may be self-selected on the basis of their discount rate. Impatient
individuals could, for example, be less likely to sign up for participation in a
laboratory experiment. On the other hand, laboratory-based studies benefit
from the use of real payments, whereas our type of study relies on a hy-
pothetical question about time discounting and it is not certain that stated
choices perfectly correspond to choices made in real life.
The children answered the following question: “If you had to choose be-
tween SEK 900 [USD 138] now versus SEK 9,000 [USD 1,380] in five years, what
would you choose?” (note that these amounts are presented in current prices).
The set of possible answers was as follows: “Certainly SEK 900 now” (1),
“Probably SEK 900 now” (2), “Cannot choose” (3), “Probably SEK 9,000 in five
years” (4), “Certainly SEK 9,000 in five years” (5). Because the answers do not
necessarily map into a monotonic scale, we present the coefficients on sepa-
rate dummy variables for each answer category. By current standards, our
measure is a relatively rough measure of time discount rates. For instance, we
cannot distinguish exponential and hyperbolic discount rates. Future research
may link more precise measures to criminal behavior. It will take many years,
however, before a link between precisely measured time preferences at age 13
and criminal behavior until age 31 will become available.
Fig. S1 shows the distribution of the answers. Despite the very high implied
annual discount rate of 58%, 13% of the children state that they prefer SEK
900 today over SEK 9,000 in 5 y. Around one-half of these children (6% of the
total sample) report that they certainly prefer the SEK 900 today. The discount
rate is well in line with discount rates used in other experimental and field
studies (see, for example, ref. 26, which provides an overview of the wide
variation in time preferences reported in various articles).
Although the Swedish murder rate is one of the lowest among all
developed countries, other types of crimes are relatively more frequent.
Farrington et al. (27) show that the Swedish crime rate in 1980 is comparable to
*The description of the data is partly based on the study by Golsteyn et al. (25). Their
paper also uses data from the Stockholm Birth Cohort (SBC). More details about the SBC
data can be found in the study by Stenberg and Vågerö (31). The data we use are
proprietary so we are prevented to post the data online. The data can, however, be
accessed by other researchers under the following conditions. Every interested (foreign
or domestic) researcher is free to access the SBC data subject to approval from the Board
of Ethical Approval and the Governing Board of SBC. These terms apply both for original
articles and for replications. The data are made available free of charge. We are able to
provide all codes needed for replication of our analysis.
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other countries such as England and Wales and the United States for many
types of crimes including assaults. This is also the conclusion that can be
drawn from more recent statistics on crime rates in the European Union
countries. Details about convictions are incorporated from the Swedish
National Crime Register (Person- och belastningsregistret), which is admin-
istered by the Swedish National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen). It contains
data on the number of crimes reported to the police that have been con-
nected to the cohort member. The reports are based on convictions in
criminal trials. There is also information from the Child Welfare Committee
(CWC) data (Socialregisteruppgifter) for children under age 18. The CWC
also received information concerning criminal behavior from schools, par-
ents, neighbors, and shopkeepers. In most cases, it was not required by law
to report these crimes to the police, unless a serious crime was involved. The
fact that we have information on crime from another source than criminal
convictions is advantageous because there is a risk that individuals with high
discount rates are more likely to be convicted for a crime conditional on
actually having committed the crime. Although we believe that this risk is
likely to be small, analyzing CWC data provides a reality check of our esti-
mates. This means that we have access to all offenses and juvenile de-
linquencies for every individual between age 13 and 31 (year 1966–1984)
that either led to a criminal conviction or to the involvement of the CWC.
The dataset we use has no information about criminal convictions after
1984. (It is not possible to add this information because the personal iden-
tifiers for the dataset have not been saved.) We follow the standard pro-
cedure in the literature and focus on the types of crimes that account for
most of the social costs of crime: violent crime and property crime. The
former includes crimes of physical violence or threats of violence and the
latter theft and receiving stolen goods. We also examine whether an indi-
vidual committed any type of crime.
It is worth mentioning that all crimes that were reported to the police and
committed by persons under age 18 were reported by the police to the CWC.
Thus, there is some overlap between criminal convictions and variables con-
cerning juvenile delinquency reported in the CWC data. The CWC records are
more accurate for childrenunder age 15because thepolicewere not allowed to
file records against them unless in unusually serious cases. They are, however,
required to report each crime to the CWC, which keeps track of them.
The dataset contains several other variables of interest to us. We use a
spatial cognitive ability test as a measure of cognitive ability. The test, which
was also taken at age 13, consists of 40 figures that are unfolded and need to
be folded mentally. Similar to the Raven Progressive Matrices test, this spatial
cognitive ability test measures fluid intelligence, which is often considered to
be a purer measure of intelligence than tests of crystallized intelligence, such
as regular IQ tests or achievement tests. Scores on crystallized intelligence
tests are in part determined by intelligence but also partly by personality
traits (28). [Note that IQ as measured by standard IQ tests would give an
average of 100 (and SD of 15). Our measure of IQ, the spatial ability test, is
not a standard IQ test, and therefore the average is different from 100.]
The dataset also contains a rich set of information on individual traits and
family/social background. Most importantly, there is information on each
parent’s highest completed level of education (four levels) and each parent’s
income in 1963 (i.e., 3 y before the survey). We control for these variables in
the regressions along with information on each parent’s year of birth, and
the month of birth of the cohort member.
The original SBC dataset matched with administrative registers consists of
13,606 observations. [In total, 15,118 children were born in 1953 in Stockholm
County. However, not all children still lived in Stockholm at the time of the
school survey (around 1%), and around 9% did not participate in the school
survey due to absence from school, which leaves 13,606 observations.] An
overwhelming majority of all crime is committed by males. Our main analysis
therefore focuses onmales, butwe present our baseline results also for females
in Tables S1 and S2. After selecting out observations with missing values on the
time-discounting variable, we are left with 6,749 males. We show the de-
scriptive statistics of the variables included in our analysis and the relationship
between time discount rates and the variables in the data in Tables S3 and S4.
To characterize the sample, we examined the link between the characteristics
of individuals who differ in time discount rates by estimating a regression
relating time discounting (a dummy for being having low discount rates) on
individual and family characteristics. We found that most of the coefficients
are statistically insignificant, with the exception of intelligence and father’s
income, which are both positively correlated with patience (Table S4).
Results
This section presents the results from our empirical analysis of the
link between time discounting and criminal behavior. The tables
show the coefficients on dummies for all answer categories to the
question on time discounting. The reference group is individuals
who with certainty prefer the immediate reward. All regressions
control for month of birth, the educational level of each parent,
cognitive ability, each parent’s income, and each parent’s year
of birth.
Tables 1 and 2 show our main results. The tables present es-
timates for our two measures of crime: criminal convictions (ages
15–31) and CWC interventions. For each measure, we show
results for crime both at the extensive margin (at least one crime)
and for total crime.
We can see in Table 1 that individual time discounting sig-
nificantly predicts criminal involvement at the extensive margin.
Individuals who are more certain that they prefer to delay the
reward are less likely to be convicted for a crime. The magnitude
of the relationship appears to be substantial. Individuals who
certainly prefer to delay the reward are 33% (0.096/0.291) less
Table 1. The link between time discounting and crime: Extensive margin
Timing of reward
Criminal convictions (age 15–31) Child Welfare Committee (age 0–18)
Any crime Violent crime Property crime Any crime Violent crime Property crime
Certainly immediate Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Probably immediate −0.108*** −0.035* −0.078*** −0.099*** −0.020 −0.088***
(0.034) (0.019) (0.027) (0.029) (0.018) (0.025)
Indifferent −0.071** −0.033* −0.056** −0.042 −0.008 −0.042
(0.032) (0.019) (0.027) (0.029) (0.018) (0.026)
Probably delay −0.097*** −0.032** −0.068*** −0.050** −0.014 −0.044**
(0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.021)
Certainly delay −0.096*** −0.021 −0.069*** −0.050** −0.010 −0.048**
(0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.020)
Sample mean 0.291 0.066 0.145 0.213 0.058 0.143
Obs 6,749 6,749 6,749 6,749 6,749 6,749
The table shows the coefficients of ordinary least-squares regressions of crime indicators on dummies for each answer to the
question whether the child at age 13 prefers SEK 900 (USD 138) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 1,380) in 5 y. The amounts are presented in
current prices. Each column represents a separate regression. The sample consists of male children born in Stockholm County in 1953. In
each regression, the dependent variable is a dummy variable with value one if a crime was administered in the data. “Any crime” in
CWC data refers to a decision by the CWC for delinquent behavior (each decision may involve multiple offenses) while “Property crime”
and “Violent crime” refer to crimes in each category. All regressions control for dummies for month of birth, intelligence, educational
level (four levels) of the parent, each parent’s income (dummies per decile), and each parent’s age (dummies per 10-y interval).
***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. Ref., reference group.
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likely to be convicted for any type of crime. To better understand
the effect size, we standardized the variable to mean zero and
unit SD, and reestimated the model. It turns out that the co-
efficient is about one-third as large as for that of our standardized
measure of intelligence. The association between intelligence and
crime is well documented in the literature. It appears that the
statistical association between time discounting and crime is
weaker for violent crime, although the magnitude of the re-
lationship is about the same when placing the coefficient in re-
lation to the mean of the dependent variable. For property crime,
the statistical significance is much stronger. Turning to CWC data,
we find similar results: strong associations between time dis-
counting and any crime as well as for property crime. However,
none of the coefficients for violent crime is statistically significant.
[In relation to this, Nagin and Pogarsky (19) report evidence from
a sample of adolescents in grades 7–12 that time preferences are
not related to violent crimes. However, poor impulse control is
related to violent crimes.]
It is evident that the individuals in the reference group clearly
stand out as being more likely to engage in crime. Unfortunately,
our measure of time discounting does not allow us to pin down
the actual discount rate. Note that individuals who prefer the
immediate reward may have an annual discount rate of anywhere
between 58% and infinity. Our findings are therefore consistent
with the idea that criminals have extremely high discount rates. It
is worth mentioning that theory would not predict that only the
most extreme category of future bias should matter. However,
the idea that criminals have discount rates that substantially di-
verge from that of the overall population does not strike us as
implausible. It is possible that individuals facing different inter-
temporal investment decisions do so using different discount
rates. For example, the discount rate used when deciding how
much to invest in education or work may differ markedly from
the discount rate used when considering engaging in criminal
activities. The results in Golsteyn et al. (25) suggest that that this
may very well be the case. Using the same sample as in the
present paper, they find clear indications that the coefficients for
the different answers to the time preference question are in-
creasing (in absolute numbers) when looking at outcomes such as
educational attainment, income, employment, and obesity. This
can be interpreted as showing that individuals use smaller
discount rates (below 58%) when making everyday choices
involving work and lifestyle with payoffs occurring very far into
the future but that the small portion of individuals in the pop-
ulation who commit crime has much larger discount rates than
what we can observe in our data. This is also one of the messages
from the model in ref. 6 where it is argued that uncertainty of
punishment affects not only the expected income from crime but
also the length of time in which a criminal can expect to earn that
stream of income. As such, the expected income from crime
must be discounted at a higher rate than the rate of discount for
income from legal work.
In Table 2, we can see that the link between time discounting
and total crime appears to be much weaker. For all outcomes,
many of the coefficients are not statistically significant. More-
over, when interpreted in relation to the sample mean, the effect
sizes are in general much lower. It therefore appears that time
discount rates predict the onset of criminal involvement better
than the frequency of its occurrence.† Put differently, being very
impatient may induce some individuals to commit crime but after
having gotten involved in crime, time discount rates matter less.
One reason could be that factors such as reduced stigma out-
weigh the importance of time discounting after having developed
a criminal lifestyle.
It is also useful to see how time discounting and crime cor-
relate across age. To this end, we show the average probability of
committing at least one crime at a given age for the group of
individuals who certainly want the immediate reward (Not pa-
tient) and the rest of the sample (Patient) along with a 95%
confidence interval (Fig. S2). We can see that, as in most other
countries, crime peaks in the late teens and early twenties, and
then falls. We can also see that individuals with the highest
discount rate exhibit higher criminal participation for all ages.
We perform a number of sensitivity checks and an exercise
where we try to probe deeper into the underlying mechanisms.
Table 2. The link between time discounting and crime: Intensive margin
Timing of reward
Criminal convictions (age 15–31) Child Welfare Committee (age 0–18)
Any crime Violent crime Property crime Any crime Violent crime Property crime
Certainly immediate Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Probably immediate −0.941** −0.123* −0.296 −0.151** −0.025 −0.456***
(0.435) (0.074) (0.188) (0.067) (0.054) (0.141)
Indifferent −0.719* −0.147** −0.207 −0.042 −0.004 −0.154
(0.416) (0.068) (0.181) (0.069) (0.052) (0.147)
Probably delay −0.655* −0.085 −0.207 −0.071 −0.033 −0.230**
(0.346) (0.064) (0.145) (0.050) (0.039) (0.114)
Certainly delay −0.581* −0.068 −0.189 −0.062 −0.024 −0.245**
(0.342) (0.064) (0.143) (0.049) (0.039) (0.111)
Sample mean 1.926 0.156 0.666 0.371 0.146 0.735
Obs 6,749 6,749 6,749 6,749 6,749 6,749
The table shows the coefficients of ordinary least-squares regressions of crime indicators on dummies for each answer to the
question whether the child at age 13 prefers SEK 900 (USD 138) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 1,380) in 5 y. The amounts are presented in
current prices. Each column represents a separate regression. The sample consists of male children born in Stockholm County in 1953.
“Any crime” in CWC data refers to a decision by the CWC for delinquent behavior (each decision may involve multiple offenses),
whereas “Property crime” and “Violent crime” refer to the number of crimes in each category. All regressions control for dummies for
month of birth, intelligence, educational level (four levels) of the parent, each parent’s income (dummies per decile), and each parent’s
age (dummies per 10-y interval). ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. Ref.,
reference group.
†This finding is in line with Blumstein et al. (32), who discuss the fact that the literature on
criminal careers typically has done a better job predicting criminal behavior at the ex-
tensive margin rather than the intensive margin. The authors mention that factors as-
sociated with crime rates (such as age, race, and sex) are in the previous literature often
assumed to be equally important at the intensive and extensive margin. However, based
on their review of research on criminal careers, they conclude that such demographic
variables do relate to the extensive margin, but they are only weakly related to the
frequency of criminal behavior.
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For example, to understand the importance of potentially
confounding factors, Tables S5 and S6 build up the relation
between time discount rates and crime, starting with the raw
correlation and gradually extending the regression with more
controls. The results indicate that the link between time dis-
counting and crime is robust to changes in the set of controls.
Because some of these covariates (e.g., parental income and
education and child intelligence) represent perhaps the most
obvious candidates for omitted variable bias, we interpret this
finding as suggesting a limited scope for other (probably less
important) omitted factors to bias our estimates in any mean-
ingful way. Moreover, we find that controlling for children’s
years of schooling tends to reduce the coefficients. This provides
suggestive evidence that time discount rates are associated to
crime through its link to human capital investments.
The fact that we find stronger effects for property crime can
also be interpreted as tentative evidence that self-control is not
the major factor driving our results. Indeed, it seems plausible
that self-control problems are more strongly connected to violent
crimes, which can be seen as crimes of passion, rather than
property crimes that are financially motivated crimes, which
typically involve an element of planning. Another piece of evi-
dence along this line comes from an exercise where we attempt
to partially control for the possible influence of self-control. Self-
control is sometimes measured using markers such as smoking,
alcohol, and drug abuse. Because there is information in the data
on whether individuals have been registered by social workers as
being abusing alcohol or narcotics, we used this information and
added a control to our baseline model for whether an individual
was recorded as being abusing alcohol or narcotics (230 obser-
vations or 3.4% of the sample). Because the estimates are almost
unchanged when adding this control (Tables S7 and S8), further
support is given to the idea that our results primarily capture
exponential time discounting.
Finally, we ran a series of regressions where we analyzed the
link between time discounting and crime in different segments of
the population (Tables S9–S11). The main finding is that time
discount rates predict future involvement in both property and
violent crime more strongly for individuals with below average
intelligence compared with individuals with at least average in-
telligence, although we note that there is no meaningful differ-
ence between the two groups for any crime.
Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the link between time discounting and
criminal behavior. Drawing on a unique database that contains
measures of time discount rates collected from a school-based
survey at age 13 and longitudinal information on criminal in-
volvement from administrative registers, we document that time
discounting significantly predicts crime.
Our results are consistent with the predictions of the standard
model of crime where individuals decide on whether or not to
engage in crime depending on the immediate benefits from the
crime and the costs from a potential future punishment. The
model has been used to motivate the use of stricter sanctions as a
way to deter potential criminals to engage in crime. Our results
potentially have other policy implications in the sense that early
interventions that make individuals more future-oriented may be
used as a tool to combat crime. The results in the literature re-
garding the malleability of time preferences are not yet settled.
Still, the results in Perez-Arce (29) do provide some support for
the argument that educational investments may be one way to
moderate high discount rates. This is interesting also because
many studies have documented that increased education policy
can be used as a way to combat crime (30). One reason for this
could be that education makes individuals more future oriented.
Admittedly, our measure of time discounting is crude by
modern standards that often focus on experimentally elicited
discount rates. Nevertheless, because this paper represents, to
our knowledge, the first empirical study of this relationship, we
believe that it does make an important contribution to the lit-
erature. In fact, the dataset is ideal for our purposes. Anyone
interested in learning about the link between adolescents’ time
preferences and adult criminal behavior would have to wait close
to 20 y for contemporary data collection efforts to render a
dataset more suitable to study this question than the one used in
the present paper. Given that our measure is crude, it is, how-
ever, worth mentioning that we expect measurement error to
play some role for the results. Because measurement error likely
attenuates the coefficients, it is reasonable to believe that the
true relationship between time discounting and criminal behav-
ior actually is stronger than is the relationship reported in
this paper.
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